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LAW JUDGES, JUDICIAL
ADMINISTRATIVE
INDEPENDENCE, AND JUDICIAL REVIEW:
QUI CUSTODIET IPSOS CUSTODES?
W. Michael Gillette'
This article, which is based on remarks that I gave at the 1998

and 1999 NAALJ Annual meetings, has four parts. In the first part, I
review some significant themes that relate to how we have come to the
present condition of administrative law in the United States and the
position that administrative judges occupy in it. Next, I offer some
prognostications with respect to problems that I believe that
administrative law judges are going to face in the future. The third part
of the article is composed of excerpts from a question and answer
session at the 1998 meeting, touching on some of the problematic
issues facing administrative law judges. In the conclusion to the article,
I discuss some of the fundamental responsibilities of all judges: to
enforce the law independently and equally with regard to all, to accord
dignity to all who come before us; to be ethical, honorable, and
professional in our work; and to be examples that foster public faith in
the rule of law.
I. THEMES:
The Origins of Administrative Law in the U.S.
In looking at the origins of the present administrative law
system in the United States, there are several themes starting about
1885, continuing through the turn of the last century with the cases of
Bi-Metallic Investment Co. v. Colorado,2 and Londoner v. Denver.3
None of those themes would seem unfamiliar to us. However, it is
W. Michael Gillette (A.B. Whitman College, 1963; LL.B. Harvard Law School,
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senior Associate Justice on the Oregon Supreme Court, having served on that body
is
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important to talk about the Depression, because the rise of the
administrative state as we know it was the result of the Depression.
The present administrative state was the direct consequence, first, of
New Deal measures that were enacted to respond to the Depression and,
second, of the United States Supreme Court's response to the New Deal.
The latter was just what you might expect from a group of nine older
white males who had been brought up in a system which didn't have all
that government activity: They thought it had to be unconstitutional.
The first decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court in response to the
New Deal declared two aspects of it unconstitutional In the famous
"hot oil" and "sick chicken" cases, Panama Refining4 and Schechter,5
the Court declared that a broad-scale delegation of authority from the
Congress of the United States to administrative agencies to create rules
of law which thereafter would be enforced against private parties and
private businesses was unconstitutional, because it gave away too much
of Congress' authority to a non-elected body. One at least can
understand, on a theoretical basis, how the Supreme Court could have
come to that conclusion, whether or not one agrees with it. Certainly,
there was a basic political science justification for the idea. But the
country's needs were dire, and the Supreme Court was not responding
to them.
The Schechter and PanamaRefining decisions were followed
by the proposal by President Roosevelt to "pack" the Court by
appointing an additional member of the Court for every member who
still was sitting and who had reached a certain age. That would have
meant that the Court would have increased from nine members to
around 15. The Supreme Court suddenly discovered that delegation of
authority to administrative agencies to engage in broad-scale rulemaking that amounted to major substantive law changes was perfectly
okay. And, from that day until 1995, the Supreme Court declined to
strike down any delegation of power, instead taking the view that
Congress could delegate virtually any power that it chose to delegate.
A few examples illustrate that proposition.

4

Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1933).
'A. L. A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
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Delegation of Authority
The Loving' case is an example of how very broad the
delegation doctrine has been. Loving involved a death penalty matter
from a military court martial. Rather than define the circumstances
under which the death penalty could be assessed against a member of
the military who commits murder while involved in military activities,
the Congress had authorized the President to define those aggravating
factors. The President did so, and the question before the Court was
whether it was permissible for the Congress to delegate that power to
the President as Commander in Chief. The Supreme Court upheld that
delegation of power.
What we used to regard as the height of delegation occurred in
7 a 1942 case. In Wickard, a poor farmer was
Wickard v. Filburn,
growing wheat just for himself -- he wasn't putting it in interstate
commerce; he wasn't even selling it downtown; he was just growing the
stuff so that he could feed his own animals. But, on account of that
innocuous activity, he was viewed as declining to cooperate with
federal agricultural production requirements. The Supreme Court held
that he was required to comply with those requirements (which limited
the amount of wheat any one farmer could grow) because, even though
the grain that he grew was only for himself, the fact that he grew it
meant that he didn't have to buy it from somebody else. His not buying
it meant that the price of grain was lower than if he had to buy it from
somebody else, and the price of grain was a matter of interstate
commerce. Therefore, the Court held, the farmer was engaged in
interstate commerce and the Congress' delegation of administrative
control over grain prices and the enforcement of the rules respecting
those prices was permissible, even against him.
After Wickard v. Filburn, any delegation seemed all right,
through stringing out a series of inferences which made everything
connected to interstate commerce. And that continued to be true until
1995, when the Lopez case was decided. Lopez was a case under the
"Gun Free School Zones Act of 1990." Now, one may support the

6

Loving v. United States, 517 U.S. 748 (1996).
Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
'United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
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concept of gun-free school zones without necessarily seeing Congress
as having any role to play respecting that issue. But Congress felt that
it had one, and enacted a law that provided various criminal penalties
for persons who possessed a gun within a gun-free zone. When a
challenge to that law reached it, the Supreme Court declared that the act
was unconstitutional as exceeding Congress's interstate commerce
powers. The argument was made, of course, that guns are sold in
interstate commerce and ammunition is sold in interstate commerce
and, therefore, where guns are used is subject to interstate commerce.
That was exactly the same kind of series of inferences involved in
Wickard v. Filburn,but this time the U.S. Supreme Court said, "Sorry,
not close enough even for government work -- the act is
unconstitutional."
The foregoing illustrations are offered to demonstrate that every
pendulum swings to a degree, even the delegation pendulum. And why
is this important to administrative law judges, who are not involved in
delegation issues? The answer is that, whether you work for state or
federal administrative agencies, your agency almost certainly operates
on a fairly expansive delegation of authority to it from a legislature,
which is simply too busy to enact all positive law and chooses, instead,
to authorize agencies to create law by rule. So the idea of delegation is
central to administrative law, and has been since the rise of the
administrative state in the 1930s.
The rise of the administrative state -- the creation of
administrative agencies with broad-scale authority, rule-making power,
and so on -- has meant that it was necessary to create administrative
adjudicators. That is so because, when an agency has broad-scale
authority (including rule-making authority), it needs people to assist it
in enforcing its rules. Hence, administrative law judges. It's not as if
there weren't administrative adjudicators before the 1930s, but the
number coming into existence since that time is enormous as compared
to the number that existed before that time. Basically, then,
administrative law judges are the children of the Depression, and your
work is, in the main, the result of governmental answers offered to the
Depression.
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Qui custodiet ipsos custodes?

The foregoing serves as background to the specific topic that I
want to address, which is captured in the Latin phrase, Qui custodiet
ipsos custodes: "Who shall watch the watchers themselves?" What this
asks is, When we set up someone to look out for us, who is going to
watch over how that person does that job? Who is going to assure us
that the person is doing the job that he or she is supposed to do, and in
the way that it is supposed to be done? Hence the reflective question,
"Who shall watch the watchers themselves?"
The question has fascinated me since I was young, because it
has seemed to me to be one of those classic imponderables. In all of
life we entrust other people to look after various aspects of our wellbeing. We have very little choice in the matter: Beginning with our
parents and, as we grow older, continuing with teachers, various
government officials, police officers, and the like, many others are
responsible for our welfare and have the duty and authority to "watch"
over us. And yet who is watching them?
The answer is: We are. You are. That is our line of work. We
are those who are set up to watch the watchers. We are those whose
responsibility it is to see to it that those who have been set up in
position of power over us observe the laws by which we entrusted that
authority to them. That is what judges do.
Judicial Independence and Judicial Review
In terms of administrative law, we conduct this exercise of
watching, first, through having administrative law judges who exercise
independent judgment with respect to determining the facts and then
applying the law to the facts that are presented to them. Secondly, and
only secondly -- not primarily -- we watch through the process that we
call "judicial review," in which courts in the traditional judicial system
will, if asked (and only if asked), conduct a further inquiry to ascertain
whether the administrative law judges' application of the law to the
facts is justified by the pertinent standards. That is what we judges in
the traditional judiciary do but, as I said, our role is secondary. The
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primary responsibility for watching those who have been placed over
us in various government agencies belongs to administrative law
judges, not to appellate courts. When so understood, it becomes clear
that the entire process, not just the appellate part, is "judicial review."
As the words suggest, "judicial review" is a review, by a judge,
of the propriety of a particular administrative decision. The first level
of judicial review in this country is conducted by the first judge who
sees a case. And who is the first judge to see a case? Very often, it is
an administrative lawjudge. Most American judges in the traditional
system -- federal or state -- don't even begin to appreciate how much
administrative law judges are the first in line to see cases. There is one
federal agency -- the Social Security Administration -- in which
administrative law judges decide more cases in one year than are
decided in all the traditional court systems of the United States
combined.9 And this is just one agency.
What does this tell us? It tells us that administrative law judges
really are the first judges to be involved in watching those who have
been set up over us. It is before the administrative law judge that those
who have been set up over us first are required to account legally for
their actions.
From the foregoing it should be clear why, when I speak of
judicial review, I speak not just of what appellate courts do, but also of
what administrative law judges do -- because judicial review is exactly
what administrative law judges do: review the legal correctness of
agency action. It may be that, in the course of what an administrative
law judge does, the judge is the one who "takes" the agency's action.
But the ALJ still is the legal "watchdog," the "clearinghouse," the
"gatekeeper," responsible for seeing to it that there is a true,
appropriate, legitimate connection between facts that exist in a
particular case and the law that is applied to that case. And that is,
reduced to its basics, the same job that appellate judges have.
What is the justification for judicial review, whether by
administrative and other trial judges or by appellate judges? For a very
long time, since well before the rise of the administrative state in the
193 Os, it was thought that judicial review was essential to assure that

9

Bernard Schwartz, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW (2"4 ed.1983), at 25-26.
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administrative agencies -- which after all are creatures of statute -- did
no more than the creating legislation intended that the agency do.
Agencies are given finite authority to accomplish certain legislative
ends, and the function of judicial review -- or of judicial "check," in
terms of "checks and balances" -- was to assure that this was all that
agencies did.
Another way to look at the need for judicial review is that it is
a normal human response to being granted power to use that power to
the fullest extent to which the power exists and (perhaps) a little
beyond. This has nothing to do with venality, nothing to do with evil.
Rather, it has to do with the normal human tendency simply to exercise
strength or authority. We are, after all, animals who tend to explore,
and one of the things that we tend to explore is the limits of our own
power. It follows, I submit, that it is desirable, useful, and probably
even necessary that there be some independent person to place a check
on the exercise of that power. Thus, judicial review.
Chevron
°
This brings me to the epoch-making Chevron' decision. I am
not sure that anyone really saw it coming, saw that it was going to turn
out to be quite the blockbuster that it turned out to be. Some recent
scholarship examining the papers of Justice Marshall suggests that even
some members of the court saw nothing unusual in what the court was
doing in that unanimous opinion. The Court was asked in the case to
determine whether an agency had the authority to adopt certain rules.
It was not a contested case involving adjudication of individual rights.
The Court held, with respect to the question of whether the particular
agency had the right through rule-making to adopt particular rules, that
there was a two-part test to be applied:
"First, always, is the question whether Congress has directly
spoken to the precise question at issue. If the intent of Congress is
clear, that is the end of the matter, for the Court as well as the agency
must give effect to the unambiguously-expressed intent of Congress.
If, however, the Court determines Congress has not directly addressed
the precise question at issue, the Court does not simply impose its own

'°Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
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construction on the statute, as would be necessary in the absence of an
administrative interpretation. Rather, if the statute is silent or
ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the question for the Court
is whether the agency's answer is based on a permissible construction
of the statute."
In other words, if you cannot tell immediately what the
legislature thought about the problem, or if the enactment does not
simply and specifically answer the question with which you are
presented, and the agency has an answer that is at least a permissible
reading of the legislation, that is the end of it. You don't go looking to
secondary sources of information with respect to what the legislature
actually may have meant. Instead, you say, "Okay, agency, we will go
along with whatever you say."
And that, I think it is fair to say, caused an uproar throughout
the legal community in the United States. As well it should have done.
Because what it represented was an abdication, in the minds of many,
of the traditional responsibility of judges independently to examine the
law to be sure that everyone understands what the law is and to assure
that the agency is following the legislature's intent. Instead, the Court
announced that, if the legislative's intent is not plain to begin with, then
the agency gets to decide what that intent was.
This brings to mind Rudyard Kipling and one of the verses from
his poem, "The Law of the Jungle":
Because of his age and his cunning,
Because of his gripe and his paw,
In all that the law leaveth open,
The word of the head wolf is law.
Remember the old line about putting the fox -- I have made a
small adjustment in predator -- to watch the henhouse? There are
certain conceptual difficulties, are there not, in the idea of allowing
agencies to act as "wolves guarding the chickens," i.e., of allowing
agencies to define the limits of their own power? One can always say,
if an agency acts contrary to legislative intent, that the legislature can
fix it. The problem with this is that, at least since 1929 or 1930, the
whole idea of delegation has been that the legislature often is too busy
or too impatient actually to pay attention to what agencies do anyway,
so it often takes a hands-off approach to agencies. And how much
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more likely is it in the face of the Chevron doctrine that Congress, or a
State legislature in the face of the adoption of the Chevron approach by
a state court, is going to pay more attention to what agencies are up to
than it did yesterday? I submit that there is no likelihood of this at all.
Chevron changed the balance of power between private citizens
and agencies, without incorporating or giving us any reason to expect
that the other checks on the agency, in the absence of particular judicial
scrutiny, would step in to take their place. So the balance has been
changed in a way that seems to many of us to be quite profound and
very concerning.
There have been many scholarly articles written on the subject
over the next few years, including one by Professor Bill Funk, who is
a very thoughtful writer on the subject." Lower courts have struggled
with the Chevron doctrine. And, of course, lawyers for government
agencies immediately began to cite Chevron to every judge that would
hear it, saying, "This is our interpretation of the statute, which is
ambiguous in that you can't quite tell what the legislature meant, and
therefore our interpretation is the only thing that matters." And a
number of Federal courts have sort of rolled over and said, "Okay,
whatever you guys say must be the law." And, over the long haul,
many state courts also have fallen into line with this same approach.
It is not clear to me why this is true. I can offer a theory: In my
experience, most traditional judges were lawyers in the traditional
system. They did not practice a lot of administrative law. They did not
go before administrative agencies very much; if they had a client that
had a case before an administrative agency, they found a young
associate to go and do that, and stayed away from it themselves, saying,
"I don't understand that area of law," or "That's not my area of
expertise." So it was that, when those same lawyers became judges,
their studied ignorance of administrative law came with them. They
had not bothered to pay attention to it, but sometimes would find
themselves in a position where they were supposed to conduct judicial
review.
With the exception of a few renegades like me who actually like
the subject and had practiced in the area a bit, who had worked with it
"William F. Funk, To Preserve MeaningfulJudicial Review, in Symposium: The
Future ofthe American Administrative Process, 49 ADMIN. L. REv. 171 (1997).
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as appellate lawyers and therefore felt immodestly that we have some
grasp of it, most judges have just "stayed away" from administrative
law. Therefore, when the Chevron doctrine came along, one readily can
understand how a lot of state judges would have said, "Whew, the U.S.
Supreme court says it is okay just to sort of wash our hands of this
responsibility, and that feels good, so let's do it."
Paradoxically, what happened is that, in announcing the
Chevron doctrine, the Supreme Court managed to renew the debate
over what the purpose of judicial review is. Because the Court in
essence had chosen not to conduct any meaningful judicial review in
that case, the question became, "What good does judicial review do,
anyway?" Put another (and more fundamental) way, "What is the
proper role of the judiciary, vis-a-vis the executive branch in this area
of government activity?" And here, three schools of thought have
emerged.
Three Schools of Thought on Judicial Review
I will use a division originally used by Professor Funk, taking
responsibility for any misunderstanding of his theory. One view is
represented by Justice Breyer, who in his book 2 has taken the
interesting view that many administrative agencies are primarily
technocratic in nature and that judicial review of their work is counterproductive, because the issues before the agencies are too technical for
judges to understand. Obviously, Justice Breyer was talking only about
certain types of agencies, such as those involved in public utilities, for
example, and his theory would not apply to "mass justice" agencies.
Nonetheless, if the doctrine applies anywhere, to some extent it has to
apply everywhere. And, as soon as you begin to try to apply it
everywhere, it's clearly not right.
Most of the decisions that most administrative agencies and
most administrative law judges have to make may be slightly technical,
but they are technical only in the sense that you may have to have an
expert testify with respect to the technical answer. But you are not a
potted palm, your brain is not mush; you are perfectly capable of

2

Breaking the Vicious Circle: Toward Effective Risk Regulation (1993).
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analyzing the technical questions and answering them. And, if you are
capable of it, why isn't Justice Breyer? This is an avoidance technique,
it has nothing to do with the inability of judges to do the work. If
judges can't do this, ifjudges can't understand the technicalities of the
work that administrative agencies do, then we had better quit. Because
agencies are the ones that have an impact on private citizens. Agencies
are government, from the point of view of most private citizens.
The second view on the Supreme Court is that of Justice Scalia.
Antonin Scalia's theory is that judicial review exists only for protecting
individual rights; it does not exist to assure agency fidelity to law.
Agency fidelity to law is assured by the oath of members of the
executive branch to obey the law -- they will look out for themselves!
But Scalia does have a good point to make, at least with respect to
making regulations, although what he says is less true with respect to
contested cases. When an agency is making regulations, he argues, the
choice of what regulation to enact is a political choice, and should be
deferred to on that ground.
It is true that an agency's decision to enact regulation A or not
to enact regulation B is a political choice of much the same kind that
the Congress makes when it chooses one public policy over another.
And, because it is a political choice, Scalia argues, the process is -- and
it should be -- pretty much beyond the reach of the judiciary. It's not
the judiciary's business -- not yours or mine -- to review political policy
choices for the validity of the choice; that is not our line of work. And
he is right about that, to a certain degree.
To illustrate: Administration A is responsible for appointing the
head of Agency X. Head of Agency X, through rulemaking, directs the
creation of a series of rules which lie well within the agency's power to
promulgate and which are consistent with the policy objectives of
Administration A. Administration B is elected, from the other political
party, and a new administrator is appointed for Agency X. The new
administrator rescinds the old rules and creates new rules which further
the policy objectives of Administration B -- policy objectives which
were advertised and which the voters knew about when they voted for
Administration B. Both of the sets of rules, although they reach
different conclusions under a broad range of circumstances, are
perfectly within the agency's power to enact, i.e., they are within the
range of policy choices that the agency may, in its discretion, choose to
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implement.
What is the proper role of courts in all of that? In my view,
none. The agency's choice and the agency's change of direction are
perfectly valid things for the agency to do. And, to the extent that
Scalia is making that point, he's fine. It's just that he doesn't quit there.
He tends to begin to view virtually everything as a sort of agency
political choice. But when you get down to the point of whether Fred
gets Social Security benefits or not, that's not much of a political
choice, especially to Fred! And so great care has to be exercised in
accepting the Scalia approach.
The third approach, with which I am happy to associate myself,
I will call the Funk approach. That approach holds that agencies exist
to carry out the law and that the role ofjudicial review is to assure that
agencies keep within the bounds of the law. That's what we are
supposed to do. That's what judicial review is supposed to be about.
Thus, to the extent that courts now excuse themselves from the duty of
carrying out that particular exercise, courts have abandoned their
traditional function and indeed have thrown those who are subject to
administrative agency jurisdiction to the wolves -- including the "head
wolf."
Chevron has created a profound shift in thinking with respect to
the role ofjudicial review. Perhaps that has had one good effect, in that
it has created new discussions with respect to what judicial review is all
about in the first place -- a topic we had sort of fallen into a comfortable
silence about. So I am not going to tell you that Chevron has been all
bad, because it has not. But it sits there. To the extent that it's being
limited by some courts, it is a slightly wounded lion, but it still has
claws. And it represents an idea which, carried to its logical extreme,
is profoundly dangerous -- for you, for me, and for the people we serve.
And so, as I have looked back over the development in the law,
although there are other themes, I have realized that there is no getting
away from Chevron. And in terms of developments in administrative
law, that which started 14 years ago with Chevron is still alive and well.
And therefore, whether a wounded beast or a perfectly healthy one, it
needs to be kept very closely in check.
At the same time, there has arisen an interesting and (if
anything) opposing trend from (where else?) California. I turn to that
next.
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The California Alternative on Judicial Review
The California alternative on judicial review actually is
reasonably old; the first case involving that approach was decided in
1974, ten years before Chevron. The California Courts of Appeal
particularly are following the approach: the so-called "vested right
leads to independent judgment" standard of review.
In California, the degree of scrutiny that is provided on judicial
review is a function of the degree to which the particular right that is
involved in a case is "vested". To give one example: Suppose you
want to open a new tavern in Costa Mesa, California. You bought the
land, which is just sitting there. You want to set up a tavern; you need
a conditional use permit from the City of Costa Mesa to build your
tavern. The city denies you the permit, based on evidence from some
people in the neighborhood that their experience with other taverns has
been that there is rowdy behavior outside them that disturbs the
tranquility of the neighborhood. Under California law, the way that
you challenge the city's decision is to go into Superior Court, seeking
an affirmative writ of mandamus that directs the city to issue you the
permit.
In this case, the Superior Court judge would ask, did the city
hear evidence that there would be an adverse impact? If the answer is
yes, the court then would ask, did the city believe that testimony? If the
answer is again yes, the court would deny mandamus, ruling that the
city is entitled to make that decision.
But suppose that, instead, you buy an existing tavern, which
already has a conditional use permit that must be renewed from time to
time. You put in a little money to update the place and apply for a
renewal of the permit. There are objections from the neighbors about
all the bad things that happen there at 2:00 in the morning. If the city
denies the permit, and you go to the same Superior Court, the judge
conducts a different kind of review: a "vested rights and independent
judgment" review. First, the judge determines whether you have a
"vested right" in the tavern or in the conditional use. The answer to that
question is that, because the tavern already existed and was being
operated on the spot, you have a vested right to continue doing that.
The question then becomes, does the evidence justify denial of the
conditional use permit, based upon the judge's independent review and
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evaluation of the evidence?
The case is called GoatHill Tavern v. The City of Costa Mesa. 3
The Superior Court concluded that there was not sufficient justification
for denying the permit. The California Court of Appeals agreed that the
trial judge's reevaluation of the evidence and conclusion was proper,
and held that the tavern had to be granted a license.
The foregoing is not the way in which this kind of work
traditionally is done. Essentially, what California has done is eliminate
the usefulness of the administrative adjudication process, choosing
simply to transfer that process back to the Superior Court. This is
revolutionary or, if you prefer, counter-revolutionary. Because that's
the way business used to be done, 50 or 60 or 70 years ago. And
California has gone back to it. Is their anything wrong with that? To
my mind, there are at least a couple of things that are very wrong with
it.
First, the California approach does violence to the concept of
the substantial evidence standard, to which the California courts purport
to be paying attention. But this is academic. The more significant
point is that it trashes the administrative law and adjudication process.
It makes that process nugatory. The process becomes one that you have
to go through but that has no meaning, unless the person with the
vested right wins. If the person with the vested right loses, he or she
then goes to Superior Court and gets to try the case, to a certain degree,
over again. The Superior Court proceeding may be on the record, with
no new evidence taken, but the proceeding still is a profoundly different
one than we are accustomed to. If you were an administrative law
judge involved in that process, you had applied the law carefully and
correctly to the evidence that you had heard, you had made findings of
credibility and findings of historical fact with respect to the evidence
that you had heard, and then it turned out that none of the effort
counted, wouldn't you be a little annoyed?
In terms of a waste of public resources, I find this disconcerting.
And I find even more disconcerting the explanation that was given in
the Costa Mesa case by the California appellate court. The court said,
"The right [the vested right to the conditional use permit] is sufficiently

'38 Cal. Rptr. 2d 385 (Cal. App. 4 Dist. 1992).
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personal, vested and important to preclude its extinction by a nonjudicial body." And apparently their view of a "non-judicial body"
would include you because, in another California appellate case called
Cooper v. Kizer, 4 there was the same ruling with respect to a claim for
medical benefits in a classic contested case of the kind with which all
of us are familiar.
So we see that, in addition to the Chevron doctrine, which (in
my view) abdicates judicial responsibility, there also is a fascinating
and intrusive approach that is being used elsewhere that effectively
negates your efforts as adjudicators. Feast or famine. Total deference,
or none.
In the long run, I find the California approach the more
worrisome. The siren song of mixing in too much, of substituting one's
own judgement for that of the ALJ,is one that is very difficult to resist.
Even the most well-meaning courts, ones who think that they have
some grasp of the scope and function ofjudicial review, may from time
to time find themselves mixing in more than they ought to do, or,
without recognizing it, reevaluating evidence more than they ought to
do, in order to accomplish an end which truly is not the court's business.
II. PROGNOSTICATIONS:
Central Panels and Judicial Independence
When I look into the future, here is what I see: First, central
panels are a coming thing. I did not expect that Oregon would have the
good sense to create one (and predicted we would not in my 1998
speech), but we have just done so this past year, as have other states in
the past several years. I think that, in the long run, the proven track
record of central panels, both in terms of saving money and of
adjudicating efficiently the administrative questions that come before
them, is going to make central panels the usual choice of the states. I
say this with optimism, but I have to note at the same time that
sometimes we are our own worst enemy, and by "we" I mean judges as
a whole -- traditional judges and administrative law judges.

"282 Cal. Rptr. 492 (Cal. App. 2 Dist. 1991).
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An illustration of this is the case of Pastranav. Chager,15 a
1996 case from the federal district court in Puerto Rico. In Pastrana,
a federal district judge was reviewing an administrative law judge's
decision. The federal district judge found, correctly, that the
administrative law judge had made remarks that demonstrated that the
administrative law judge was not hearing the case fairly. So the case
was reversed and remanded to a new hearing. That's fine. But the
federal district judge didn't stop there. Instead, the judge affirmatively
criticized the administrative law judge and suggested that the
administrative law judge ought to be disciplined.
There are enough people outside the judiciary who want to
attack the independence of the judiciary. We don't need to be shooting
at each other. Ordinarily, it is not the business of any appellate judge
to recommend, to control, or to direct the disciplining of anybody. The
fact that a judge didn't try a case the way that I, as an appellate judge,
determine that it should have been tried, or didn't behave as well as I
think the judge should have, does not clothe me with authority to
discipline. There are procedures for doing that, and sometimes those
procedures lead to a recommendation that a judge be disciplined or
removed, but the rest of us need to have faith in those procedures. To
take gratuitous shots at a defenseless administrative law judge is itself
close to indefensible.
From the foregoing, you can see that, while I am confident that
some states will adopt central panels, I have an ongoing concern about
the needs of judicial independence. We must recognize that, even if a
central panel is created, there are still any number of ways in which
judicial independence can be compromised, through budgetary and
other threats, inappropriate oversight, exparte communications, and the
like. It is important always to be on guard against such potential
avenues for compromising independence, even with a central panel.
Land Use and Administrative Law Judges
The second prediction that I offer, and I am confident about this
to a high degree -- so I may be especially wrong -- has to do with the

'5917 F. Supp. 103 (D. Puerto Rico 1996).
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decisions by the United States Supreme Court in the last 10 years
involving land use, and the rigor with which local government land use
choices that limit the uses that owners may make of private property are
being scrutinized. Such decisions 6 suggest to me that land use is going
to turn out to be a very hot topic, and not just for those of you who
ordinarily deal with land use questions. As I watch what's going on in
the creative minds of lawyers around Oregon and the cases that I read
from elsewhere, lawyers are finding wonderful ways to work
independent constitutional questions into areas where you never would
have suspected them to arise.
Let me give you an example of a kind of traditional
administrative law problem, unrelated to land use, that suddenly could
take on important land use implications. Suppose a public employee is
opposed to his agency taking a particular action with respect to certain
private property, because the employee feels that for the agency to do
that amounts to a taking of that private property. The employee
complains; his or her boss fires the employee for insubordination.
You are the judge who is sitting on the employee's termination
case, determining whether the firing was for cause or not. The agency's
argument is that it is insubordination to criticize publicly the agency's
choice to do what it did. The answer is that the property owner may
have had the constitutional right not to have the agency do what it did,
and the employee may have had an independent constitutional right (as
well as a civic duty) to speak up. You can see how as administrative
law judges you could get caught up in this.
My point is that land use is a hot button. The U.S. Supreme
Court seems to feel that we've been a little cavalier with private
property and it's about time that we started paying more attention to the
interests of the individuals that are being lost with increasing
government regulation of land use. That may be right -- I don't
necessarily disagree with it as an abstract proposition -- but I do think
that it is going to give rise to some fascinating and unexpected new
cases touching on land use issues.

"6See, e.g., Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994), Nolan v. California Coastal
Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
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Due Process
I want to note as well that, while I think that there is going to be
a revolution on the issue of due process in some direction, I cannot tell
where due process is going at the moment. My uncertainty arises out
of the fact that, at the same time the Supreme Court appears to feel that
there is a substantive due process right to more than some land owners
are receiving these days, the Court seems also to be profoundly
uninterested in the traditional kinds of due process considerations that
led to the decision in Matthews v. Eldridge," and the many cases that
came after it. Those of us who have grown up with the idea that the
question to be asked, when an individual is faced with losing a license
or something else that the government offers, is not whether the person
gets a hearing but, rather, what kind of hearing and when, may need to
rethink this. Because the Supreme Court has been reaching conclusions
lately that no hearing at all is required with respect to some kinds of
cases, based on a cost-benefit analysis. The Court, under the whip hand
of Justice Scalia, is fiercely interested in the idea of cost-benefit
analysis in terms of the meaning of constitutional rights. Because of
that, I think that there is a revolution coming with respect both to the
scope of one's right to due process and to the nature of the process that
has to be provided.
As a matter of interest, in recognition of the foregoing, my court
may have fired a shot across the Supreme Court's bow. I am the author
for my court of a decision called Noble v. Boardof Parole,'s in which
the issue was whether a particular state process by which a person was
labeled a predatory sex offender comported with due process. The
conclusion of the case was that the particular process being followed by
the state did not meet the requirements of due process. The question,
however, is an extremely close one under Supreme Court precedent
and what I was doing in writing the opinion was saying that precedents
can be read either way and this is the way that I think they work. The
State notified my court that it intended to seek certiorari, so maybe I

'7424 U.S. 319 (1976).
"327 Or. 485, 964 P. 2d 990 (1998).
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have caused trouble.' 9
The Judge's Job
We all are in this together. Inescapably, administrative law and
the administrative state impinge on the public more and more often as
there are more and more of us. And it seems to me that when driver's
licenses, house remodeling, vacations at the beach or the mountains,
clean air and water, and cigarettes are all impacted by administrative
regulations, the high likelihood is that you as an administrative law
judge are going to be the person whom the public encounters, you are
going to be the person who is seen as a reflection of the reliability of
the rule of law, and you are going to be the person who is conducting
that pivotal, first level of judicial review to determine whether an
administrative agency really is carrying out its functions within the
limits of the law. That's what you do. As an appellate judge, I will be
re-examining your conclusions -- second-guessing you, if you will -but that's all. It primarily is your job to conduct that judicial review,
not mine. And, when I do "second-guess" you, I shall try to remember
that I am supposed to confine myself to the same legal questions that
you were asked, and that I simply am taking one more look at them.
III. QUESTIONS and ANSWERS
Now, I don't want to deny you the chance to throw a brickbat or
two at me, so I will take some questions.
Question: In a situation where the agency has not promulgated
a rule with respect to its interpretation of a statute, but instead takes an
action and announces its interpretation in the course of a contested case,
in a situation in which there was no prior opportunity for an affected
person to know what the interpretation of the statute was going to be,
does Chevron apply? Are we still supposed to defer where we have an
unambiguous statute?
Answer: The answer to the first part of that question is yes, a

'Not enough, apparently. The State did not seek certiorari. But, for a view contrary
to Noble from an Oregon federal district court judge, see Hadsell v. Kelly, 1999 WL 1038732
(D. Or. 1999).
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reviewing court would defer, insofar as the agency is using adjudication
rather than rule-making to interpret the statutes that govern it. This is
the way courts are looking at it, not distinguishing between rule-making
cases, as Chevron was, and adjudication cases in which interpretations
are announced in orders. The answer to the second part of the question
(in my view) is: If the statute is unambiguous, there is nothing to defer
to.
Question: Can an agency put an unpublished policy before an
ALJ in the course of a case, and then expect the ALJ to follow it?
Answer: Well, they do it. I hope that the ALJ will then make
a record, giving the other side an opportunity to respond and to object,
if the other side wishes to do so, and thereafter proceed based upon
what appears to be the validity of the objection, if any. If interjection
of the unpublished policy is not objected to, it's not a problem; if it is,
then you have to deal with the legal objection that's made. Somewhat
closer to the bone is the question of what you do if you think that the
agency is trying impermissibly to interfere with the way in which you
are conducting your work. I suppose you need to make a record with
respect to that, too, which takes more than a little courage. But I don't
know any other way to deal with it.
Question: To follow up, what I have in mind is not a minute or
minor policy matter, but a policy matter that goes to the heart
generically of the existence of the agency. That is to say, it goes to the
purposes for which it was created. And those goals and purposes are
not necessarily statutorily defined.
Answer: If this is a real case, then I don't want to appear to be
prepared to rule on it. And I bet dollars to doughnuts that it's real. Let
me tell you what matters to me at the second judicial review -remember that, as I have said, you are the first level. What matters to
me at the second level is that at the first level the law that was to be
applied was known, was accessible, to all of God's children who were
taking part in the case, at a time when they had an opportunity to
proceed under a fair understanding of that law. In other words, I want
to be assured that the rules of the game were not switched in midstream. That's what matters to me. It's a matter of notice. It's a matter
of afair hearing.
If an agency has strong views with respect to what its purposes
are and, therefore, with respect to the way in which its particular cases
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ought to be conducted, the agency is perfectly entitled to have those.
It's just that the other side -- assuming that the particular case involves
a true adversarial proceeding between the agency and an individual -is entitled to notice, and an opportunity to prepare evidence or
otherwise to meet the particular agency's choices or perception of its
legal responsibilities.
With respect to your role, your role is to be the intermediary.
You're the gate-keeper. If the agency has made a legal choice, proper
notice has been give to the other side, and the legal choice lies within
the agency's authority, then it's your job to enforce it. But it's your job
first to decide whether the agency's legal choice does lie within the
agency's authority. That's the inescapable minimum. It's always
upsetting to have the people who are supposed to behave with
scrupulous fairness appear to be trying to steal a march. Reviewing
courts don't like it, and I know that you don't either, but the way in
which the question is put to me implies that the questioner feels that
this could be happening. If that is so, then what is called for more than
anything else is the hardest thing for any of us to summon, and that is
the courage to look the people we work with every day in the eye and
say, "You don't get to do this, because I won't let you."
To answer another follow-up question, in applying a rule of law,
a judge may be moved as much by what one perceives to be the spirit
that lies behind the law as the letter of the law itself. And one's factfinding function cannot avoid being influenced to some degree by that
perception. I have no difficulty with that, so long as the sprit that one
perceives is consonant with the wording of the law. As soon as it
contradicts that wording, however, what the judge actually is saying is,
"I know better what the law means (or ought to mean) than what the
words of the law say." Bad choice. Being imbued with the actual spirit
and purposes for which your agency exists is fine, but the one thing we
cannot let it do is have any influence on how we see the facts. The facts
are whatever they are, and the legal consequences that flow from them
flow only from them after we decide what the facts are. The facts are
not what they are because the law is what it is; the facts are what they
are, period.
Question: With the move toward a central panel in Oregon,
there was some discussion yesterday about whether that would affect
the ALJ's duty to ensure the development of a full and fair record.
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What are your thoughts on that?
Answer: I do not see a change. My initial reaction is that this
would not be affected by whether the judge works for the particular
agency or works for the central panel. It seems to me that the
obligation, to the extent that it exists, exists without regard to who signs
the checks.
Ouestion: Given the fact that some ALJs in some jurisdictions
are not attorneys, and given the fact that most supreme courts have
jurisdiction over the discipline of attorneys only, what is the effect and
interaction between a supreme court and the administrative agencies
with respect to the application of the canons ofjudicial ethics and other
considerations of that kind?
Answer:
To the extent that a lawyer is performing
administrative law judge functions, the disciplinary process by which
administrative law judges are disciplined for cause is a matter that will
be reviewed, i.e., given a second-level form of judicial review, only
when the internal disciplinary process is finished. As I suggested with
respect to the case from Puerto Rico, it's not the function of supreme
courts to step in immediately and rebuke a lawyer qua lawyer with
respect to what that lawyer was doing as an administrative law judge.
It may have reason to do so later, but the primary responsibility lies
within whatever agency is responsible for disciplining administrative
law judges, without regard to whether they are law-trained or not.
The use of the canons of judicial ethics as a standard by which
the disciplinary process is carried out is a separate issue. If the
disciplining agency wishes to use those, and if the claim is that there
has been a violation of them, fine. Then the disciplining authority can
take the action that it deems appropriate, based upon whatever violation
it finds, and the court's involvement (if any) will come by way of the
usual form ofjudicial review. In any such review, we certainly will be
applying a familiar body of law, but we will be doing so solely to
determine whether that body of law has been applied correctly by the
disciplining agency.
IV. CONCLUSION: THE RESPONSIBILITIES OF JUDGES
I commend NAALJ and those who attend these annual
meetings. It means a great deal to me, and to a great many others who
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think about administrative law and care about it. Just a glance at your
programs tells us what you think the purpose of an organization like
this really is. The emphasis here is on education, ethics, and
professionalism, just as it ought to be. Because you are judges in just
the same way that I am a judge. You have, if anything, far more impact
that I do, on individuals. I may make decisions that have a more
general impact on all the people of Oregon whom I serve. But you have
an impact one at a time on individuals who will not forget you, whereas
most of those who are affected by the opinions that I write don't even
know who I am. I have the benefit of an anonymity that you do not; for
most citizens, the law wears your face. The fact that you want to be
professional in what you do is a profound compliment to you, and a
profoundly moving and encouraging development for me.
The public will believe in, will have faith in, the rule of law
only if the judges whom the public sees appear to have those basic
qualities that we all want to see in those who are responsible for justice:
(1) judges who work diligently and selflessly to find the truth; (2)
judges who treat all before them with a generous and equal dignity; (3)
judges who seek to understand the law and who are fearless in their
willingness to follow it; and (4) judges who take their work, but not
necessarily themselves, seriously. Only if we have those qualities will
the public believe in us. And only if the public believes in us do we
have any true hope of succeeding.
Faith in the rule of law can be fostered by an honorable and a
professional judiciary, which is the kind that you and your association
are trying to create. It just as easily can be destroyed by a dishonorable
or unprofessional judiciary, and that is the kind that we always can have
with us, if we are careless enough to permit it.
I began this talk by noting the wonderful Latin quotation, "Qui
custodiet ipsos custodes?" I close by offering you this answer, in which
I hope all of you will join: "Nos, in quas manus leges commissae sunt,
custodes custodiemus." "We, into whose hands the law has been
entrusted, we shall watch the watchers." Please remember those words,
and the high ideals that they represent. As a member of the judiciary,
I pledge to you that I will strive to set an example that will justify all
reasonable men and woman in believing in the rule of law. I expect
nothing less, and I know I will see nothing less, from you.

